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a b s t r a c t
We consider the problem of allocating applicants to courses, where each applicant
has a subset of acceptable courses that she ranks in strict order of preference. Each
applicant and course has a capacity, indicating the maximum number of courses
and applicants they can be assigned to, respectively. We thus essentially have a
many-to-many bipartite matching problem with one-sided preferences, which has
applications to the assignment of students to optional courses at a university.
We consider additive preferences and lexicographic preferences as two means of
extending preferences over individual courses to preferences over bundles of courses.
We additionally focus on the case that courses have prerequisite constraints: we
will mainly treat these constraints as compulsory, but we also allow alternative
prerequisites. We further study the case where courses may be corequisites.
For these extensions to the basic problem, we present the following algorithmic
results, which are mainly concerned with the computation of Pareto optimal
matchings (POMs). Firstly, we consider compulsory prerequisites. For additive
preferences, we show that the problem of finding a POM is NP-hard. On the other
hand, in the case of lexicographic preferences we give a polynomial-time algorithm
for finding a POM, based on the well-known sequential mechanism. However we
show that the problem of deciding whether a given matching is Pareto optimal
is co-NP-complete. We further prove that finding a maximum cardinality (Pareto
optimal) matching is NP-hard. Under alternative prerequisites, we show that finding
a POM is NP-hard for either additive or lexicographic preferences. Finally we
consider corequisites. We prove that, as in the case of compulsory prerequisites,
finding a POM is NP-hard for additive preferences, though solvable in polynomial
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time for lexicographic preferences. In the latter case, the problem of finding a
maximum cardinality POM is NP-hard and very difficult to approximate.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Problems involving the allocation of indivisible goods to agents have gained a lot of attention in the
literature, since they model many real scenarios, including the allocation of pupils to study places [2],
workers to positions [3], researchers to projects [4], tenants to houses [5] and students to courses [6], etc.
We assume that agents on one side of the market (pupils, workers, researchers, tenants, students) have
preferences over objects on the other side of the market (study places, positions, projects, courses, etc.) but
not vice versa. In such a setting where the choices of agents are in general conflicting, economists regard
Pareto optimality (or Pareto efficiency) as a basic, fundamental criterion to be satisfied by an allocation.
This concept guarantees that no agent can be made better off without another agent becoming worse off.
A popular and very intuitive approach to finding Pareto optimal matchings is represented by the class of
sequential allocation mechanisms [7–10].
In the one-to-one case (each agent receives at most one object, and each object can be assigned to at
most one agent) this mechanism has been given several different names in the literature, including serial
dictatorship [5,11], queue allocation [12], Greedy-POM [13] and sequential mechanism [9,10], etc. Several
authors independently proved that a matching is Pareto optimal if and only if it can be obtained by the
serial dictatorship mechanism (Svensson in 1994 [12], Abdulkadirogˇlu and So¨nmez in 1998 [5], Abraham
et al. in 2004 [13], and Brams and King in 2005 [8]).
In general many-to-many matching problems (agents can receive more than one object, and objects can be
assigned to more than one agent), the sequential allocation mechanism works as follows: a central authority
decides on an ordering of agents (often called a policy) that can contain multiple copies of an agent (up
to her capacity). According to the selected policy, an agent who has her turn chooses her most preferred
object among those that still have a free slot. This approach was used in [9,10], where the properties of the
obtained allocation with respect to the chosen policy and strategic issues are studied.
The serial dictatorship mechanism is a special case of the sequential allocation mechanism where the
policy contains each agent exactly once, and when agent a is dealt with, she chooses her entire most-preferred
bundle of objects. The difficulty with serial dictatorship is that it can output a matching that is highly unfair.
For example, it is easy to see that if there are two agents, each of whom finds acceptable all objects and
has capacity equal to the number of objects, and each object has capacity 1, then the serial dictatorship
mechanism will assign all objects to the first agent specified by the policy and no object to the other agent.
In this paper we shall concentrate on one real-life application of this allocation problem that arises in
education, and so our terminology will involve applicants (students) for the agents and courses for the
objects. In most universities students have some freedom in their choice of courses, but at the same time
they are bound by the rules of the particular university. A detailed description of the rules of the allocation
process and the analysis of the behaviour of students at Harvard Business School, based on real data,
is provided by Budish and Cantillon [6]. They assume that students have a linear ordering of individual
courses and their preferences over bundles of courses are responsive to these orderings. The emphasis in [6]
was on strategic questions. The empirical results confirmed the theoretical findings that, loosely speaking,
dictatorships (where students choose one at a time their entire most preferred available bundle) are the only
mechanisms that are strategy-proof and ex-post Pareto optimal.
Another field experiment in course allocation is described by Diebold et al. [14]. The authors compared
the properties of allocations obtained by the sequential allocation mechanism where the policy is determined
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by the arrival time of students (i.e., first-come first-served) and by two modifications of the Gale–Shapley
student-optimal mechanism, i.e., they assumed that courses may also have preferences or priorities over
students. Moreover, they only considered the case when each student can be assigned to at most one course.
In reality, a student can attend more courses, but not all possible bundles are feasible for her. Cechla´rova´
et al. [15] considered explicitly-defined notions of feasibility for bundles of courses. For these feasibility
concepts, a given bundle can be checked for feasibility for a given applicant in time polynomial in the
number of courses. Such an algorithm may check for example if no two courses in the bundle are scheduled
at the same time, or if the student has enough budget to pay the fees for all the courses in the bundle,
etc. Cechla´rova´ et al. [15] found that a sufficient condition for a general sequential allocation mechanism to
output a Pareto optimal matching is that feasible bundles of courses form families that are closed with respect
to subsets, and preferences of students over bundles are lexicographic. They also showed that under these
assumptions a converse result holds, i.e., each Pareto optimal matching can be obtained by the sequential
allocation mechanism if a suitable policy is chosen.
Prerequisites and corequisites
In this paper we deal with prerequisite and corequisite constraints. Prerequisite constraints model the
situation where a student may be allowed to subscribe to a course c only if she subscribes to a set C ′ of
other course(s). The courses in C ′ are usually called prerequisite courses, or prerequisites, for c. For example,
at a School of Mathematics, an Optimal Control Theory course may have as its prerequisites a course on
Differential Equations as well as a course in Linear Algebra; a prerequisite for a Differential Equations course
could be a Calculus course, etc. In realistic situations, prerequisite constraints are acyclic, as they usually
require that prerequisite courses for course c should be completed before the student starts course c itself.
On the other hand, corequisite constraints model the situation where a student takes course c1 if and only
if she takes course c2. These courses are referred to as corequisite courses, or corequisites. For example, a
corequisite constraint may act on two courses: one that is a theoretical programming course and the other
that is a series of corresponding programming lab sessions. We introduce a general model that includes
acyclic prerequisites as well as corequisites.
We allow for the possibility that different students may have different prerequisite constraints. For
example, for a doctoral study program in Economics, an economics graduate may have as a prerequisite a
mathematical course and, on the other hand, a mathematics graduate may have as a prerequisite a course
on microeconomics, etc. In the case of corequisites (symmetric prerequisites) we shall pay special attention
to the situation when corequisite courses are identical for all applicants, as this case usually occurs in reality.
Finally, the third model considers alternative prerequisites. Here it is assumed that certain courses require
that a student subscribes to at least one of a set of other courses. For example, a course in mathematical
modelling may require that a student attends one of a range of courses that deal with a specific mathematical
modelling software package, such as Maple, MATLAB or Mathematica.
As we assume that applicants express their preferences only over individual courses, a suitable extension
of these preferences to preferences over bundles of courses has to be defined. Among the most popular
extensions are responsive preferences [16]. That is, an applicant has responsive preferences over bundles of
courses if bundle C ′ is preferred to bundle C ′′ whenever C ′ is obtained from C ′′ by replacing some course
in C ′′ by a more preferred course not contained in C ′′. Responsiveness is a very mild requirement and
responsive preferences form a very wide and variable class. Therefore we shall restrict our attention to two
specific examples, namely additive [6,9,17] and lexicographic [17–21] preferences. Although lexicographic
preferences can be modelled as additive preferences by choosing appropriate weights [9], we would like to
avoid this approach as it requires very large numerical values, moreover, assuming lexicographic preferences
from the outset leads to more straightforward algorithms.
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To the best of our knowledge, matchings with prerequisite constraints have not been studied yet from
an algorithmic perspective. Some connections can be found in the literature on scheduling with precedence
constraints [22], but, unlike in the scheduling domain, there is no common optimality criterion for all the
agents, since their individual choices are often conflicting and all have to be taken into account.
We would however like to draw the reader’s attention to the works of Guerin et al. [23] and Dodson
et al. [24], who analyse a version of a course selection problem in greater depth, using probabilistic methods.
Their work is a part of a larger research programme that involves advising college students about what
courses to study and when, taking into account not only the required course prerequisites, but also the
students’ course histories and obtained grades. Based on this information, the authors try to estimate
a student’s ability to take multiple courses concurrently, with the goal to optimise the student’s total
expected utility and her chances of moving successfully towards graduation. They consider also temporal
factors, meaning that a student can only take a certain course in the current semester if she has completed
the necessary prerequisites during previous semesters. By contrast, here we assume that students choose all
their courses as well as their necessary prerequisites simultaneously, and we concentrate on computational
problems connected with producing a matching that fulfils a global welfare criterion.
Our contribution
As mentioned above, we will formally introduce a general model of course allocation involving
prerequisites. We assume that applicants have preferences over individual courses and we consider two
extensions of these preferences to preferences over bundles of courses. For additive preferences we show
that computing a Pareto optimal matching is an NP-hard problem. In fact, we will show a stronger result,
namely, that the problem of finding a most-preferred feasible bundle of courses for a given applicant in this
setting is NP-hard.
In the case of lexicographic preferences we illustrate that the simple sequential allocation mechanism and
its natural modification may output a matching that either violates prerequisites or Pareto optimality. By
contrast, if we stipulate that on her turn, an applicant chooses her most preferred course together with all
the necessary prerequisites, a Pareto optimal matching will be produced. Still, it is impossible to obtain
each possible Pareto optimal matching in this way. It is also unlikely that an efficient algorithm will be able
to produce all Pareto optimal matchings, since, as we will show, the problem of checking whether a given
matching admits a Pareto improvement is NP-complete.
Then we consider structural properties of Pareto optimal matchings. It is known that in the simplest one-
to-one model (naturally without prerequisites) finding a Pareto optimal matching with minimum cardinality
is NP-hard, but a Pareto optimal matching with maximum cardinality can be found in polynomial time [13].
By contrast, we show that the problem of finding such a matching with maximum cardinality is NP-hard in
both special cases, when prerequisites are acyclic as well as when they are symmetric.
For the case with uniform corequisites, i.e., identical for all applicants, we propose another modification
of the sequential allocation mechanism for finding Pareto optimal matchings. This model is closely related to
matchings with sizes [25] or many-to-many matchings with price-budget constraints [15], and we strengthen
the existing results by showing that the problem of finding a maximum size Pareto optimal matching is not
approximable within N1−ε, for any ε > 0, unless P = NP , where N is the total capacity of the applicants.
The final model involves alternative prerequisites (i.e., where a constraint takes the form that an applicant
can attend course c1 only if she also attends either course c2 or course c3) seems to be computationally the
most challenging one. We show that although a Pareto optimal matching always exists, it cannot be computed
efficiently unless P=NP, both under additive as well as lexicographic preferences of applicants.
Our paper constitutes a first attempt to assess the computational complexity of Pareto optimal course
allocation in the presence of prerequisites/corequisites. In terms of computational complexity we obtain
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mostly negative results for the general domain of additive preferences and some positive results for the
special case of lexicographic preferences. This means that in practice, and for further research, the type
of preferences that applicants have (i.e., whether they are close to being lexicographic or additive) and
further institutional details (such as a limitation on the number or structure of prerequisites/corequisites)
are extremely important; we demonstrate that no “one size fits all” solutions are available.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give formal definitions of the problem models
and define relevant notation and terminology. Section 3 explains hardness of the problem with additive
preferences and Section 4 contains the description of the modification of the sequential allocation mechanism
for finding a Pareto optimal matching in the general model with prerequisites. Sections 5–7 deal separately
with the three different models, involving acyclic prerequisites, corequisites and alternative prerequisites
respectively. Finally, Section 8 concludes with some open problems and possible directions for future research.
2. Definitions and notation
2.1. Basic course allocation problem
An instance of the Course Allocation problem ( ca) involves a set A = {a1, a2, . . . , an1} of applicants
and a set C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn2} of courses. Each course cj ∈ C has a capacity q(cj) that denotes the
maximum number of applicants that can be assigned to cj . Similarly each applicant ai ∈ A has a capacity
q(ai) denoting the maximum number of courses that she can attend. The vector q denotes applicants’ and
courses’ capacities. Moreover ai has a strict linear order (preference list) P (ai) over a subset of C. We
shall represent ai’s preferences P (ai) as a simple ordered list of courses, from the most preferred to the
least preferred one. With some abuse of notation, we shall say that a course cj is acceptable to applicant
ai if cj ∈ P (ai), otherwise cj is unacceptable to ai. P denotes the n1-tuple of applicants’ preferences. Thus
altogether, the tuple I = (A,C,q,P) constitutes an instance of ca.
An assignment M is a subset of A×C. The set of applicants assigned to a course cj ∈ C will be denoted
by M(cj) = {ai ∈ A : (ai, cj) ∈ M} and similarly, the bundle of courses assigned to an applicant ai is
M(ai) = {cj ∈ C : (ai, cj) ∈ M}. An assignment M is a matching if, for each ai ∈ A, M(ai) ⊆ P (ai) and
|M(ai)| ≤ q(ai), and for each cj ∈ C, |M(cj)| ≤ q(cj). In the presence of prerequisites, additional feasibility
constraints are to be satisfied by a matching, which will be defined below. An applicant ai ∈ A is said to
be undersubscribed (respectively full) in a matching M if |M(ai)| < q(ai) (respectively |M(ai)| = q(ai)).
Similarly we may define undersubscribed and full for a course cj relative to M .
An applicant ai ∈ A has additive preferences over bundles of courses if she has a utility uai(cj) for
each course cj ∈ C, and she prefers a bundle of courses C1 ⊆ C to another bundle C2 ⊆ C if and only if∑
cj∈C1uai(cj) >
∑
cj∈C2uai(cj).
Applicant ai compares bundles of courses lexicographically if, given two different bundles C1 ⊆ C and
C2 ⊆ C she prefers C1 to C2 if and only if her most preferred course in the symmetric difference C1 ⊕ C2
belongs to C1. Notice that the lexicographic ordering on bundles of courses generated by a strict preference
order P (ai) is also strict.
Applicant ai prefers matching M ′ to matching M if she prefers M ′(ai) to M(ai). We say that a matching
M ′ (Pareto) dominates a matching M if at least one applicant prefers M ′ to M and no applicant prefers
M to M ′.
A Pareto optimal matching (or POM for short), is a matching that is not (Pareto) dominated by any
other matching. As the dominance relation is a partial order over M, the set of all matchings in I, and M
is finite, a POM exists for each instance of ca.
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2.2. Prerequisites
We now define the extension of ca involving prerequisites. Suppose that for each applicant ai ∈ A, there
is a directed graph Dai = (C,Eai). If there is an arc (cj , ck) ∈ Eai we say that course ck is an immediate
prerequisite of course cj for applicant ai. By transitivity, the prerequisite relation→ai of applicant ai is then
defined in the following way: course cl is a prerequisite of course cj if the corresponding vertex cl is reachable
from vertex cj in the digraph Dai ; we shall denote this by cj→aicl.
Now define the feasibility of a bundle of courses relative to the prerequisites constraints as follows.
Definition 1. A bundle of courses C ′ ⊆ C is feasible for an applicant ai ∈ A if the following three conditions
are fulfilled:
(i) C ′ ⊆ P (ai);
(ii) |C ′| ≤ q(ai);
(iii) C ′ fulfils ai’s prerequisites, i.e., for each cj , ck ∈ C, if cj ∈ C ′ and cj→aick then ck ∈ C ′.
We shall denote by
→ai
cj the set of courses that are reachable from vertex cj in the prerequisites digraph
Dai , including vertex cj itself, i.e.,
→ai
cj = {ck ∈ C; cj→aick} ∪ {cj}. For technical reasons, we assume that→ai
cj ⊆ P (ai) for each ai ∈ A and each cj ∈ P (ai). If this is not the case then we can easily modify the
preference list of applicant ai either by deleting a course cj if P (ai) does not contain all the courses in
→ai
cj ,
or we can append the missing courses to the end of P (ai).
An instance I of the Course Allocation problem with PreRequisites ( capr) comprises a tuple I =
(A,C,q,P,→), where (A,C,q,P) is an instance of ca and → is the n1-tuple of prerequisite relations
→ai for each applicant ai ∈ A (that are without loss of generality obtained from an n1-tuple of prerequisite
digraphs as described in the first paragraph). In an instance of capr, a matching M is as defined in the ca
case, together with the additional property that, for each applicant ai ∈ A, M(ai) is feasible for ai.
In an instance of capr where the prerequisites are the same for all applicants, (i.e., when the prerequisites
are uniform) we may drop the applicant subscript when referring to the prerequisite relation →.
A special case of capr occurs when the prerequisites digraph Dai is acyclic for each applicant ai ∈ A.
This case corresponds to the situations that arise most often in reality.
2.3. Corequisites
Another special case of capr occurs when constraints on courses are given in the form of corequisites. We
assume that, for each applicant ai ∈ A, the digraph Dai is symmetric, i.e., (cj , ck) ∈ Eai holds if and only if
(ck, cj) ∈ Eai for any two courses cj , ck ∈ C. This means that each digraph Dai is in fact an undirected graph
(we keep the notation Dai) and it turns out that for our purposes only connected components are relevant.
These connected components effectively partition the set of courses into equivalence classes C1ai , C
2
ai
, . . . , Crai .
Two courses cj , ck ∈ C in the same equivalence class are said to be each other’s corequisites; we write cj↔aick.
Hence applicant ai can subscribe either to all courses in one equivalence class or to none.
Formally, we define a bundle of courses C ′ ⊆ C to be feasible for a given applicant ai ∈ A if Conditions (i)
and (ii) in Definition 1 are satisfied, and moreover, for any two courses cj , ck ∈ C, if cj↔aick then cj ∈ C ′
if and only if ck ∈ C ′. An instance I of the Course Allocation problem with CoRequisites ( cacr) is a tuple
I = (A,C,q,P,↔), where (A,C,q,P) is an instance of ca and ↔ is an n1-tuple of corequisite relations
↔ai for each applicant ai ∈ A (that are without loss of generality obtained from an n1-tuple of corequisite
digraphs as described above). In an instance of cacr, a matching M is as defined in the ca case, together
with the additional property that, for each applicant ai ∈ A, M(ai) is feasible for ai.
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We shall pay particular attention to the special case of cacr that arises when corequisites are uniform,
i.e., Dai = Daj for each ai, aj ∈ A — we denote this restriction by caucr (the Course Allocation problem
with Uniform CoRequisites). This reflects the fact that, often in practice, corequisite constraints on courses
are not applicant-specific.
2.4. Alternative prerequisites
While our previous models correspond to the situations when the prerequisites are compulsory, our
final model is a generalisation of capr in which prerequisites are in general presented in the form of
alternatives. Formally, each applicant ai has a mapping ↦→ai : C → 2C with the following meaning: if
cj ↦→ai{ci1 , ci2 , . . . , cik}, it must then hold that if ai wants to attend course cj then she has to attend at least
one of the courses ci1 , ci2 , . . . , cik too.
We thus define a bundle of courses C ′ ⊆ C to be feasible for a given applicant ai ∈ A if Conditions (i)
and (ii) in Definition 1 are satisfied, and moreover, for any course cj ∈ C ′, if cj ↦→ai{ci1 , ci2 , . . . , cik}, then
cir ∈ C ′ for some r (1 ≤ r ≤ k).
An instance I of the Course Allocation problem with Alternative PreRequisites ( caapr) comprises a
tuple I = (A,C,q,P, ↦→), where (A,C,q,P) is an instance of ca and ↦→ is the n1-tuple of mappings ↦→ai
for each applicant ai ∈ A. In an instance of caapr, a matching M is as defined in the ca case, together
with the additional property that, for each applicant ai ∈ A, M(ai) is feasible for ai.
3. Additive preferences
It turns out that the problem of finding a POM under additive preferences is NP-hard, even in the case
when all applicants have acyclic or all have symmetric prerequisites. Note that in the NP-hardness results
in this section it does not matter if additive preferences are implicitly given or need to be explicitly elicited,
because a single applicant can be assumed to know her course utility values.
Lemma 2. The problem of finding a most-preferred feasible bundle of courses of a given applicant with
additive preferences in capr is NP-hard, even when the prerequisite digraph of the applicant is acyclic.
Proof. We transform from the knapsack problem, which is defined as follows. An instance I of knapsack
comprises a set of integers w1, w2, . . . , wn, p1, p2, . . . , pn,W,P . The problem is to decide whether there exists
a set K ⊆ {1, 2 . . . , n} such that ∑i∈Kwi ≤W and ∑i∈Kpi ≥ P . knapsack is NP-complete [26].
Let us construct an instance J of capr as follows. There is a single applicant a1 such that q(a1) = W .
The set of courses is C ∪D, where C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} and D = ∪ni=1{d1i , d2i , . . . , dwi−1i }. For each course ci
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), its utility for applicant a1 is equal to pi + δi, where δi will be defined shortly. Moreover ci has
wi−1 immediate prerequisites d1i , d2i , . . . , dwi−1i . For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and j (1 ≤ j ≤ wi−1), dji has utility
εji for a1, where the δ and ε values are all positive, distinct and add up to less than 1. They are selected
simply to ensure that a1’s preferences over individual courses are strict. It is easy to see that in J , a1 has a
feasible bundle with utility at least P if and only if I is a yes-instance of knapsack.
Clearly a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a most-preferred feasible bundle of courses for a1 can be
used to determine whether a1 has a feasible bundle in J with utility at least P , hence the result. □
Notice that the arguments in the proof of the above lemma also remain valid if we stipulate that ci ↔ dji
holds for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and j (1 ≤ j ≤ wi − 1). So we also have the following assertion.
Lemma 3. The problem of finding a most-preferred feasible bundle of courses of a given applicant with
additive preferences in cacr is NP-hard.
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In the case of a single applicant a1, a matching M is a POM if and only if a1 is assigned in M a
most-preferred feasible bundle of courses, otherwise M is dominated by assigning a1 to this bundle. Hence
the above lemma directly implies the following result.
Theorem 4. Given an instance of capr with additive preferences, the problem of finding a POM is
NP-hard even if there is only a single applicant and even when her prerequisites are acyclic or when they
are symmetric.
Given these negative results, we do not pursue additive preferences any further in this paper, and instead
turn our attention to lexicographic preferences.
4. Finding a POM for lexicographic preferences
From now on we assume that preferences of applicants are lexicographic. In this section we explore
variants of the sequential allocation mechanism, and show that one formulation allows us to find a POM in
polynomial time. This mechanism, referred to as SM-CAPR, does however have some drawbacks: it is not
truthful (see Section 8) and it is not able to compute all POMs in general (see Example 9).
In the context of course allocation when there are some dependencies among courses (for instance the
constraints on prerequisites in capr) the standard sequential mechanism might output an allocation that
does not fulfil some constraints on prerequisites. On the other hand, if we require that an applicant can only
choose a course if she is already assigned all its prerequisites, the output may be a matching that is not
Pareto optimal. This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 5. Construct a capr instance in which A = {a1, a2} and C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}. Each applicant has
capacity 2 and each course has capacity 1. The prerequisites of both applicants are the same, and are as
follows:
c1 → c3; c2 → c4.
The applicants have the following preference lists:
P (a1) : c1, c2, c4, c3
P (a2) : c2, c1, c3, c4.
The sequential allocation mechanism with policy σ = a1, a2, a1, a2 will assign to applicant a1 the
bundle {c1, c4} and to applicant a2 the bundle {c2, c3}. Clearly, neither of the assigned bundles fulfils
the prerequisites.
Now suppose that in the sequential allocation mechanism an applicant is allowed to choose the most-
preferred undersubscribed course for which she already has all the prerequisites. Let the policy start with
a1, a2. Applicant a1 can choose neither c1 nor c2, as these courses require a prerequisite that she is not
assigned yet. So she chooses c4. Similarly, applicant a2 will choose c3. When these applicants are allowed to
pick their next course, irrespective of the remainder of the policy, a1 must choose c2 and a2 must choose c1.
So in the resulting matchingM we haveM(a1) = {c2, c4} andM(a2) = {c1, c3}. This matching is clearly not
Pareto optimal, since both applicants (having lexicographic preferences) will strictly improve by exchanging
their assignments. □
Therefore we propose a variant of the sequential allocation mechanism, denoted by SM-CAPR, that can
be regarded as being “in between” the serial dictatorship mechanism and the general sequential allocation
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Algorithm 1 SM-CAPR
Require: capr instance I and a policy σ
Ensure: return M , a POM in I
1: M := ∅;
2: for each applicant ai ∈ σ in turn do
3: feasible := false;
4: while ai has not exhausted her preference list and not feasible do
5: cj := next course in ai’s list;
6: if cj /∈M(ai) and cj is undersubscribed then
7: S :=
→ai
cj ;
8: feasible := true;
9: for each ck ∈ S do
10: if ck ∈M(ai) then
11: S := S\{ck};
12: else if ck is full then
13: feasible := false;
14: if feasible then
15: if |M(ai)|+ |S| ≤ q(ai) then
16: for each ck ∈ S do
17: M :=M ∪ {(ai, ck)};
18: else
19: feasible := false;
20: return M ;
mechanism. Suppose a policy σ is fixed; again one applicant can appear in σ several times, up to her capacity.
Applicant ai on her turn identifies her most-preferred course cj that she has not yet considered, and that
she is not already assigned to (if no such course cj exists then ai is said to have exhausted her preference list
and will be assigned no more courses). If cj is full or ai is already assigned to cj then ai considers the next
course on her list (on the same turn). We then compute the reachable set
→ai
cj of cj (we shall explain how to
do this efficiently in the proof of Theorem 6). If all courses ck in
→ai
cj satisfy the property that either (i) ck
has a free place or (ii) ck is already assigned to ai, and the number of courses in
→ai
cj not already assigned
to ai does not exceed the remaining capacity of ai, then ai is assigned the bundle
→ai
cj . If it is impossible
to assign bundle
→ai
cj to ai (as signified by the boolean feasible becoming false) then ai moves to the next
course in her preference list until either she is assigned to some bundle or her preference list is exhausted.
This completes a single turn for ai.
The pseudocode for SM-CAPR is given in Algorithm 1. This algorithm constructs a POM M in a given
capr instance I relative to a given policy σ. Notice that serial dictatorship will be obtained as a special
case of SM-CAPR if all the copies of one applicant form a substring (i.e., a contiguous subsequence) of the
policy. We now show that SM-CAPR constructs a POM and is an efficient algorithm.
Theorem 6. Algorithm SM-CAPR produces a POM for a given instance I of capr and for a given policy σ
in I. The complexity of the algorithm is O(N+L(n2+|E|)), where N is the sum of the applicants’ capacities,
n2 is the number of courses, L is the total length of the applicants’ preference lists and |E| = maxai∈A|Eai |
where |Eai | is the number of arcs in Dai .
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that the assignment M produced by SM-CAPR is a matching in I.
Suppose for a contradiction that M is not a POM. Then there exists a matching M ′ that dominates M . Let
A′ be the set of applicants who prefer their assignment in M ′ to their assignment in M . Define a stage to
be an iteration of the while loop, and for a given stage s, define its number to be the integer k such that
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s is the kth iteration of the while loop, taken over the entire execution of the algorithm. For each aj ∈ A′,
consider the first stage where a course, say cij , was identified for aj at line 5, such that cij ∈M ′(aj)\M(aj),
and let sj be the number of this stage. Let ak = argminaj∈A′{sj}.
As cik ∈ M ′(ak), all the prerequisites of cik also belong to M ′(ak). Since sk is the first stage in which
a course cik was identified for ak in line 5, such that cik ∈ M ′(ak) \M(ak), all the courses assigned in M
to any applicant aj in previous stages also belong to M ′(aj), for otherwise M ′ does not dominate M . Also,
clearly cik ̸∈M(ak). Thus it was not the case that applicant ak failed to receive course cik in M at stage sk
because ak did not have room for cik and all of its prerequisites not already assigned to her in M . Rather,
applicant ak failed to receive course cik in M at stage sk because at least one course in
→ak
cik , say cr, was
already full in M before stage sk. It follows from our previous remark that in M ′, all the places in cr are
occupied by applicants other than ak. Thus cik cannot be assigned to ak in M ′ after all, a contradiction.
To derive the complexity bound of the algorithm, let us first observe that the number of iterations of
the for loop in line 2 is O(|σ|) = O(N), where N is the sum of the applicants’ capacities, whilst the total
number of iterations of the while loop in line 4, taken over the entire execution of the algorithm, is O(L),
where L is the total length of the applicants’ preference lists. At line 5 we assume that the next course for
an applicant ai is maintained by a pointer that initially points to the head of ai’s preference list, and once
the course cj pointed to by ai’s pointer has been found, the pointer moves on one position (if cj was the
last course on ai’s list then the pointer becomes null, indicating that ai has exhausted her list).
Now consider the steps needed when exploring a course cj in the preference list of applicant ai. To
construct the list of courses in S =
→ai
cj in line 7, we have to search the digraph Dai ; by standard graph
traversal techniques this requires O(|Eai |) steps, where |Eai | is the number of arcs in Dai . Each of the for
loops occupying lines 9–13 and 16–17 has O(n2) overall complexity, as the size of S is O(n2). This means
that the total time required by the algorithm is O(N + L(n2 + |E|)), where |E| = maxai∈A|Eai | and L is
the total length of the applicants’ preference lists. □
The complexity of SM-CAPR is no better than O(N + L(n2 + |E|)) in the worst case, as the following
example shows. Notice however that since the construction involves a long chain of prerequisites, in more
realistic cases we can expect that SM-CAPR performs much better than the theoretical upper bound may
suggest.
Example 7. Consider a capr instance in which A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} is the set of applicants and
C = {c1, c2, . . . , c2n} is the set of courses, for some n ≥ 1. Assume that each course has capacity 1,
whilst each applicant has capacity n and ranks all courses in increasing indicial order. Also suppose that
the immediate prerequisites for each applicant are as follows:
c1 → c2 → · · · → c2n.
There are n POMs: in the POM Mi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), ai is assigned the set of courses {cn+1, cn+2, . . . , c2n} and
no course is assigned to any other applicant. Given any policy σ, let ai be the first applicant considered
during an execution of SM-CAPR. When
→ai
c1 is constructed in line 7, 2n courses are returned; likewise when→ai
c2 is constructed, 2n− 1 courses are returned, and so on. This continues until
→ai
cn+1 is constructed, leading
to the matching Mi being formed at this while loop iteration. Note that even if the process of constructing
S =
→ai
cj were to halt as soon as |S| > q(ai), the total number of courses checked at this step of SM-CAPR
is still Ω(n2). Similarly, the number of courses checked at each other applicant’s turn in the policy is also
Ω(n2); the only difference being that in each such case SM-CAPR determines that cn+i is full, for each i
(1 ≤ i ≤ n). The overall number of steps used by SM-CAPR is then Ω(n3) = O(N + L(n2 + |E|)). □
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Our next two examples indicate that in general, SM-CAPR is not capable of generating all POMs for a
given capr instance, even if there are only two applicants and three courses and the capacity of each course
is 1. In Example 8 the prerequisites of all applicants are the same. In Example 9 they are different, but each
course has at most one prerequisite.
Example 8. Let A = {a1, a2}, C = {c1, c2, c3}, capacity of each course is 1 and course c1 have two
prerequisites as follows:
c1 → c2; c1 → c3. (1)
Each applicant has capacity 3 and the following preference list: c1, c2, c3.
Depending on the policy, SM-CAPR outputs either the matching that assigns all three courses to a1, or
the matching that assigns all three courses to a2. However, it is easy to see that the two matchings that
assign c2 to one applicant and c3 to the other one are also Pareto optimal.
Example 9. The instance is the same as in the previous example; only the prerequisites of the applicants
are different:
c1→a1c3; c2→a2c3. (2)
Each applicant has capacity 2 and their preferences are as follows:
P (a1) : c1, c2, c3 P (a2) : c2, c1, c3.
There are 4 different POMs, as follows:
M1(a1) = {c1, c3}, M1(a2) = ∅;
M2(a1) = ∅, M2(a2) = {c2, c3};
M3(a1) = {c2}, M3(a2) = {c1, c3};
M4(a1) = {c2, c3}, M3(a2) = {c1}.
SM-CAPR outputs M1 with a policy in which a1 is first, and M2 with a policy in which a2 is first. Notice
that neither M3 nor M4 can be obtained by SM-CAPR.
Theorem 4 shows that finding a POM in the presence of additive preferences is NP-hard. It is instructive
to show where SM-CAPR can fail to find a POM in this case.
Example 10. Let I be an instance of capr in which there are two applicants, a1, a2, each of which has
capacity 2, and four courses, c1, c2, c3, c4, each of which has capacity 1. The prerequisites of both applicants
are the same, and are as follows:
c1 → c2; c3 → c4.
The utilities of the courses for the applicants are as follows:
ua1(c1) = ua2(c3) = 6
ua1(c3) = ua2(c1) = 4
ua1(c4) = ua2(c2) = 3
ua1(c2) = ua2(c4) = 0
and their ordinal preferences are consistent with these utilities. Regardless of the policy, SM-CAPR
constructs the matching M = {(a1, c1), (a1, c2), (a2, c3), (a2, c4)}. M is not a POM as it is dominated
by M ′ = {(a1, c3), (a1, c4), (a2, c1), (a2, c2)}. □
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In the following sections we consider separately the special cases of capr involving acyclic prerequisites
and symmetric prerequisites (corequisites). We shall deal with the problems of testing a given matching for
Pareto optimality and with the structure of the set of POMs.
5. Acyclic preferences
In the previous section we gave a polynomial-time algorithm for constructing a POM in a general instance
of capr. However, this algorithm was not able to construct all POMs, even when prerequisite digraphs were
acyclic. An alternative approach could involve starting with an arbitrary matching, and for as long as the
current matchingM is dominated, replaceM by any matching that dominates it. However, the difficulty with
this method is that the problem of determining whether a matching is Pareto optimal is computationally
hard, as we demonstrate by our next result. This hardness result also shows that there is unlikely to be a
“nice” (polynomial-time checkable) characterisation of a POM, in contrast to the case where there are no
prerequisites [15]. We firstly define the following problems:
Name: exact 3- cover
Instance: a set X = {x1, x2, . . . , x3n} and a set T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tm} such that for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ m),
Ti ⊆ X and |Ti| = 3.
Question: is there a subset T ′ of T such that Ti ∩ Tj = ∅ for each Ti, Tj ∈ T ′ and ∪Ti∈T ′Ti = X?
Name: dom capr
Instance: an instance I of capr and a matching M in I
Question: is there a matching M ′ that dominates M in I?
Theorem 11. dom capr is NP-complete even if prerequisites are acyclic, each course has capacity 1 and
has at most one immediate prerequisite for each applicant.
Proof. Clearly dom capr is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce from exact 3- cover, which is
NP-complete [26]. Let I be an instance of exact 3- cover as defined above. For each Ti ∈ T , let us denote
the elements that belong to Ti by xi1 , xi2 , xi3 . Obviously, we lose no generality by assuming that m ≥ n.
We construct an instance J of dom capr based on I in the following way. The set of applicants is
A = {a1, a2, . . . , am+1}. The capacities are q(ai) = 4 (1 ≤ i ≤ m) and q(am+1) = 2n + m. The set of
courses is C = T ∪X ∪Y ∪W , where T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tm}, X = {x1, x2, . . . , x3n}, Y = {y1, y2, . . . , ym} and
W = {w1, w2, . . . , wm−n}. (Some of the courses in J derived from the elements and sets in I are denoted
by identical symbols, but no ambiguity should arise.) Each course has capacity 1. The preferences of the
applicants are:
P (ai) : Ti, [W ], yi, xi1 , xi2 , xi3 (1 ≤ i ≤ m)
P (am+1) : y1, [X], [W ], y2, . . . , ym
where the symbols [W ] and [X] denote all the courses in W and X, respectively, in an arbitrary strict order.
Recall that {xi1 , xi2 , xi3} ⊆ X (1 ≤ i ≤ m). The prerequisites of applicants are:
ai : Ti→aixi1→aixi2→aixi3 (1 ≤ i ≤ m)
am+1 : y1→am+1y2→am+1 · · ·→am+1ym
Define the following matching:
M = {(ai, yi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} ∪ {(am+1, xj) : 1 ≤ j ≤ 3n} ∪ {(am+1, wk) : 1 ≤ k ≤ m− n}.
We claim that I admits an exact cover if and only if M is dominated in J .
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For, suppose that {Tj1 , Tj2 , . . . , Tjn} is an exact cover in I. We construct a matching M ′ in J as follows.
For each k (1 ≤ k ≤ n), in M ′, assign ajk to Tjk and to ajk ’s three prerequisites of Tjk that belong to X.
Let A′ = {aj1 , aj2 , . . . , ajn , am+1} and let A \ A′ = {ak1 , ak2 , . . . , akm−n}. For each r (1 ≤ r ≤ m − n), in
M ′, assign akr to wr. Finally in M ′, assign am+1 to every course in Y . It is straightforward to verify that
M ′ dominates M in J .
Conversely, suppose there exists a matching M ′ that dominates M in J . Then, at least one applicant
must be better off in M ′ compared to M .
If am+1 improves, she must obtain y1 and so, due to her prerequisites, all the courses in Y . This means
that each applicant ai (1 ≤ i ≤ m) must obtain a course that she prefers to yi.
Each such applicant ai can improve relative to M in two ways. Either she obtains in M ′ a course in W ,
or she obtains Ti. In the latter case then she must receive the corresponding courses xi1 , xi2 , xi3 in M ′. In
either of these two cases, since am+1 cannot be worse off, she must obtain in M ′ the course y1 and hence
all courses in Y .
This means that in M ′ all the applicants must strictly improve compared to M . As there are only n−m
courses in W , there are exactly n applicants in A\{am+1} – let these applicants be {aj1 , aj2 , . . . , ajn} – who
obtain a course in T and its three prerequisites in X. As the capacity of each course is 1, it follows that
{Tjk : 1 ≤ j ≤ n} is an exact cover in I. □
We remark that the variant of dom capr for additive preferences is also NP-complete by Theorem 11,
since lexicographic preferences can be viewed as a special case of additive preferences by creating utilities
that steeply decrease in line with applicants’ preferences – see [9] for more details.
Now we turn our attention to the size of POMs. Example 8 shows that an instance of capr may admit
POMs of different cardinalities, where the cardinality of a POM refers to the number of occupied course
slots. It is known that finding a POM with minimum cardinality is an NP-hard problem even for ha, the
House Allocation problem (i.e., the restriction of ca in which each applicant and each course has capacity
1) [13, Theorem 2]. However, for ha [13, Theorem 1] and ca [15, Theorem 6]), the problem of finding a
maximum cardinality POM is solvable in polynomial time. By contrast, the same problem in the capr
context is NP-hard, as we demonstrate next via two different proofs. Our first proof of this result shows that
hardness holds even if the matching is not required to be Pareto optimal.
We firstly define some problems. Let max capr and max pom capr denote the problems of finding a
maximum cardinality matching and a maximum cardinality POM respectively, given an instance of capr.
Let max capr-d denote the decision version of max capr: given an instance I of capr and an integer K,
decide whether I admits a matching of cardinality at least K. We obtain max pom capr-d from max pom
capr similarly.
Theorem 12. max capr-d is NP-complete, even if prerequisites are acyclic, each applicant has capacity
4 and each course has capacity 1, and the prerequisites are the same for all applicants.
Proof. Clearly max capr-d is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce from ind set-d in cubic graphs;
here ind set-d is the decision version of ind set, the problem of finding a maximum independent set in a
given graph. ind set-d is NP-complete in cubic graphs [27,28]. Let ⟨G,K⟩ be an instance of ind set-d in
cubic graphs, where G = (V,E) is a cubic graph andK is a positive integer. Assume that V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}
and E = {e1, e2, . . . , em}. For a given vertex vi ∈ V , let Ei ⊆ E denote the set of edges incident to vi in G.
Clearly |Ei| = 3 as G is cubic.
We form an instance I of max capr-d as follows. Let A be the set of applicants and let V ∪E be the set
of courses, where A = {ai : vi ∈ V } (we use the same notation for the vertices and edges in G as we do for
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the courses in I, but no ambiguity should arise.) Let the capacity of each applicant be 4 and the capacity
of each course be 1. The preference list of each applicant is as follows:
ai : vi [Ei] (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
where the symbol [Ei] denotes all members of Ei listed in arbitrary order. For each vi ∈ V and for each
ej ∈ Ei, define the prerequisite vi → ej for all applicants. We claim that G has an independent set of size
at least K if and only if I has a matching of size at least m+K.
For, suppose that S is an independent set in G where |S| ≥ K. Let A′ = {ai ∈ A : vi ∈ S}. We form an
assignment M in I as follows. For each applicant ai ∈ A′, assign ai to vi plus the prerequisite courses in Ei.
Then for each applicant ai ̸∈ A′, assign ai to any remaining courses in Ei (if any). It is straightforward to
verify that M is a matching in I. Also |M | = m+ |S| ≥ m+K, since every applicant ai ∈ A′ obtains vi and
all prerequisite courses in Ei, and then the applicants in A \ A′ are collectively assigned to all remaining
unmatched courses in E.
Conversely suppose that M is a matching in I such that |M | ≥ m +K. Let S denote the courses in V
that are matched in M , and suppose that |S| < K. Then since |E| = m and all courses have capacity 1,
|M | ≤ |S|+ |E| ≤ m+ |S| < m+K, a contradiction. Hence |S| ≥ K. We now claim that S is an independent
set in G. For, suppose that vi and vj are two adjacent vertices in G that are both in S. Clearly (ai, vi) ∈M
and (aj , vj) ∈ M . But since vi and vj are adjacent in G, it is then impossible for both ai and aj to meet
their prerequisites on vi and vj in I, respectively, a contradiction. □
Corollary 13. max pom capr-d is NP-hard, even if prerequisites are acyclic and uniform, each applicant
has capacity 4 and each course has capacity 1.
Proof. We firstly remark that, in view of Theorem 11, it is not known whether max pom capr-d belongs
to NP. To show NP-hardness, notice that in the proof of Theorem 12, the matchingM in I constructed from
an independent set S in G is in fact Pareto optimal. To see this, let σ be an ordering of the applicants such
that every applicant in A′ precedes every applicant in A \ A′. Let M be the result of running Algorithm
SM-CAPR relative to the ordering σ. It follows by Theorem 6 that M is a POM in I. The remainder of the
proof of Theorem 12 can then be used to show that max pom capr-d is NP-hard. □
We now give an alternative proof of Corollary 13 for the case that the constructed matching is required
to be Pareto optimal. This gives NP-hardness for stronger restrictions on prerequisites than those given by
Corollary 13. Our reduction involves a transformation from the following NP-complete problem [29]:
Name: (2,2) -e3 -sat
Instance: a Boolean formula B, where each clause in B has size three, and each variable occurs exactly
twice as an unnegated literal and exactly twice as a negated literal in B.
Question: is B satisfiable?
Theorem 14. max pom capr-d is NP-hard, even if prerequisites are acyclic and uniform, each applicant
has capacity at most 2, each course has capacity 1 and at most one prerequisite.
Proof. We reduce from (2,2) -e3 -sat as defined above. Let B be an instance of (2,2) -e3 -sat, where
V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} is the set of variables and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} is the set of clauses. We construct an
instance I of max pom capr-d as follows. Let X ∪ Y be the set of courses, where X = {x1i , x2i , x¯1i , x¯2i : 1 ≤
i ≤ n} and Y = {y1i , y2i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. The courses in X correspond to the first and second occurrences of
vi and v¯i in B for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let A ∪ G be the set of applicants, where A = {aj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
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and G = {g1i , g2i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Each course has capacity 1. Each applicant in A has capacity 1, whilst
each applicant in G has capacity 2. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), define the prerequisite y1i → y2i , which is the
same for all applicants. For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and for each s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3), let x(csj) denote the X-course
corresponding to the literal appearing at position s of clause cj in B. For example if the second position of
clause c5 contains the second occurrence of literal v¯i, then x(c25) = x¯2i . The preference lists of the applicants
are as follows:
P (aj) : x(c1j ), x(c2j ), x(c3j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
P (g1i ) : y1i , y2i , x1i , x2i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
P (g2i ) : y1i , y2i , x¯1i , x¯2i (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
We claim that B has a satisfying truth assignment if and only if I has a POM of size m+ 4n.
For, suppose that f is a satisfying truth assignment for B. We form a matching M in I as follows. For
each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if f(vi)=true then add the pairs (g1i , y1i ), (g1i , y2i ), (g2i , x¯1i ), (g2i , x¯2i ) to M . On the other
hand if f(vi)=false then add the pairs (g1i , x1i ), (g1i , x2i ), (g2i , y1i ), (g2i , y2i ) to M . For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m),
at least one literal in cj is true under f . Let s be the minimum integer such that the literal at position s of
cj is true under f . Course x(csj) is still unmatched by construction; add (aj , x(csj)) to M . It may be verified
that M is a POM of size m+ 4n in I.
Conversely suppose that M is a POM in I of size m+ 4n. Then the cardinality of M implies that every
applicant is full in M . We firstly show that, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), either {(g1i , y1i ), (g1i , y2i )} ⊆ M or
{(g2i , y1i ), (g2i , y2i )} ⊆M . Suppose this is not the case. As a consequence of the prerequisites, if (gri , y1i ) ∈M
for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r ∈ {1, 2}, then (gri , y2i ) ∈M . Suppose now that (gri , y2i ) ∈M for some r ∈ {1, 2},
but (gri , y1i ) ̸∈M . Let M ′ be the matching obtained from M by removing any assignee of gri worse than y2i
(if such an assignee exists) and adding (gri , y1i ) to M . Then M ′ dominates M , a contradiction. Now suppose
that y2i is unmatched in M . Let M ′ be the matching obtained from M by removing any assignee of g1i
worse than y2i (if such an assignee exists) and adding (g1i , yri ) to M (r ∈ {1, 2}). Then M ′ dominates M , a
contradiction. Thus the claim is established. It follows that for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), either g1i is matched in
M to two members of X and g2i is matched in M to two members of Y , or vice versa.
Now create a truth assignment f in B as follows. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if (g1i , y1i ) ∈M , set f(vi)=true,
otherwise set f(vi)=false. We claim that f is a satisfying truth assignment for B. For, let j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) be
given. Then (aj , x(csj)) ∈ M for some s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3). If x(csj) = xri for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r (r ∈ {1, 2})
then f(vi) = true by construction. Similarly if x(csj) = x¯ri for some (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r (r ∈ {1, 2}) then
f(vi) = false by construction. Hence f satisfies B. □
The next example shows that the difference in cardinalities between POMs may be arbitrary, and that
SM-CAPR is not in general a constant-factor approximation algorithm for max pom capr.
Example 15. Consider a capr instance I in which A = {a1, a2} and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} for some n ≥ 1.
Let the preferences of the applicants be
P (a1) : c1, c2, . . . , cn P (a2) : cn
and let ci → ci+1 for each applicant (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1). Assume that a1 has capacity n, whilst the capacity of
a2 and the capacity of every course is 1.
There are two POMs in I: if SM-CAPR is executed relative to a policy in which a1 is first then we obtain
the POM M1 that assigns all the n courses to a1 and nothing to a2; if instead a2 is first, we obtain the
POM M2 that assigns nothing to a1 and the single course cn to a2. Hence executing SM-CAPR relative
to different policies can give rise to POMs with arbitrarily large difference in cardinality. It follows that
SM-CAPR is not in general a constant-factor approximation algorithm for max pom capr. However, notice
that in this example the cardinality of the set of courses that are reachable from each course is not bounded
by a constant; enforcing such a condition could improve the approximation possibilities. □
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Algorithm 2 Modified lists for CACR
Require: cacr instance I
Ensure: return modified preference lists containing supercourses
1: for each applicant ai ∈ A do
2: for each connected component (supercourse) Ckai in Dai do
3: available(Ckai):=true;
4: for each course cj in ai’s preference list do ▷ in preference order
5: if available(C(cj)) then
6: add C(cj) to the modified preference list of ai;
7: available(C(cj)):=false;
6. Symmetric prerequisites — corequisites
In this section we focus on cacr, the extension of ca involving corequisite courses. Let us remind the
reader that applicant ai’s prerequisite constraints are in the form of corequisites if the digraph Dai is
symmetric, i.e., (cj , ck) ∈ Eai holds if and only if (ck, cj) ∈ Eai for any two courses cj , ck ∈ C. In this case
we can think of Dai as an undirected graph. The graph Dai is a collection of connected components that
partition the set of courses into equivalence classes C1ai , C
2
ai
, . . . , Crai (later to be referred to as supercourses),
and ai can subscribe either to all the courses in one equivalence class or to none. The equivalence class
containing course cj will be denoted by C(cj).
Algorithm SM-CAPR finds a POM when preferences are lexicographic for general prerequisite relations,
hence it can also be used when the prerequisites of applicants are in the form of corequisites. However, if
this is the case, we can achieve a better computational complexity with a specialised algorithm.
The main idea of Algorithm SM-CACR is to work on supercourses. Each applicant’s preference list is
replaced by the modified preference list containing supercourses. As we assume lexicographic preferences,
each supercourse Ckai occupies the position of the most preferred course cj ∈ Ckai in the original preference
list of applicant ai.
In the preprocessing phase, for each applicant ai we search the graph Dai to create its connected
components (supercourses) and to find their sizes, where s(Cj) denotes the size of supercourse Cj . By
standard graph traversal techniques this requires O(|Eai |) steps for applicant ai, altogether O(n1|E|) steps,
where |E| = maxai∈A|Eai |. If the corequisites are not applicant specific, i.e., we are given an instance of
caucr, we only need O(|E|) steps.
Then we create the modified preference lists containing supercourses; this is accomplished by Algorithm
2. Each supercourse Ckai is initially available, indicating that it has not already been processed, which is
represented by setting variable available(Ckai) to be true. We then scan ai’s preference list in preference
order. For each course cj in ai’s list, if C(cj) is available we add C(cj) to ai’s modified preference list and
set variable available(C(cj)) to be false. Algorithm 2 needs O(n1n2 + L) steps altogether.
The sequential mechanism SM-CACR for cacr can be executed by working on the modified preference
profile as follows. The mechanism works according to a given policy σ in stages. In one stage, the applicant ai
who next has her turn according to σ chooses the most-preferred supercourse Cj in her modified preference
list to which she has not yet applied. Applicant ai is assigned to Cj (and subsequently to all the courses
ck with C(ck) = Cj) if two conditions are fulfilled: (i) the number of courses assigned to ai so far plus the
cardinality of Cj does not exceed q(ai), and (ii) each course ck ∈ Cj still has a free slot. If this is not possible,
at the same stage ai applies to her next supercourse until she is either assigned some supercourse or her
preference list is exhausted. Moving down the preference lists can be performed using pointers similarly as
in SM-CAPR. This mechanism is described in detail in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3 SM-CACR
Require: cacr instance I and a policy σ
Ensure: return M , a POM in I
1: M := ∅;
2: for each applicant ai ∈ σ in turn do
3: feasible := false;
4: while ai has not exhausted her modified preference list and not feasible do
5: Cj := next supercourse in ai’s modified list;
6: feasible := true;
7: if |M(ai)|+ s(Cj) ≤ q(ai) then
8: for each ck ∈ Cj do
9: if ck is full then
10: feasible := false;
11: if feasible then
12: for each ck ∈ Cj do
13: M :=M ∪ {(ai, ck)};
14: else
15: feasible := false;
16: return M ;
Theorem 16. Algorithm 3 correctly computes a POM in an instance of cacr in O(N + n1(n2 + |E|))
steps, where N is the total capacity of all courses, n1 and n2 are the numbers of applicants and courses
respectively, and |E| = maxai∈A|Eai |.
Proof. Feasibility and Pareto optimality of the obtained matching can be proved in a similar fashion to
the proof of Theorem 6.
To derive the complexity bound, recall that for the pre-processing we need O(n1|E|) steps and for
Algorithm 2 we need O(n1n2 + L) steps, as already mentioned. Algorithm 3 uses O(N) steps for the for
loop, the while loop has O(L) iterations. As supercourses partition the set of courses into disjoint subsets,
each course ck ∈ C will be treated at most once for each applicant during the whole algorithm. So the lines
5–14 taken over the entire execution of the algorithm need at most O(n1n2) steps. This gives altogether the
complexity bound O(N + n1(n2 + |E|)). □
In the caucr model, where corequisites are uniform, the complexity bound of Algorithm 3 improves to
O(N + |E|+ n1n2), as all the digraphs Dai are the same. Moreover, after the modification described prior
to Theorem 16 in which courses are merged into common supercourses, caucr becomes closely related to
the matching problem with sizes considered in [25] and it is equivalent to cap, the extension of ca with
price-budget constraints described in [15]. For an instance I of cap, it is known that for each POM M in
I, there exists a policy σ such that executing SM-CACR relative to σ produces M [15, Theorem 3] and also
a characterisation is known that gives rise to a polynomial-time algorithm to determine whether a given
matching is Pareto optimal. However, if the corequisites are applicant-specific, neither is true.
Example 17. Here we show that, in case of applicant-specific corequisites, there exist POMs that the
mechanism SM-CACR is not capable of reaching under any policy. This example is very similar to Example 9.
We have again two applicants a1, a2 and three courses c1, c2, c3, each applicant has capacity 2 and each course
has capacity 1. Applicants have the following preference lists:
P (a1) : c1, c2, c3
P (a2) : c2, c1, c3
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and their corequisites are
c1↔a1c3 c2↔a2c3.
The modified preference lists for this instance are
P (a1) : Ca11 , C
a1
2
P (a2) : Ca22 , C
a2
1
where Ca11 = {c1, c3}, Ca12 = {c2} and Ca22 = {c2, c3}, Ca21 = {c1}. SM-CACR returns the matching
Mi = {(ai, ci), (ai, c3)} if the first applicant in the policy is ai (i ∈ {1, 2}). However the matching
M = {(a1, c2), (a2, c1)} is also Pareto optimal and cannot be obtained by SM-CACR. □
For applicant-specific corequisites we even have the following intractability result.
Theorem 18. dom cacr with applicant-specific corequisites is NP-complete even if each course has
capacity 1.
Proof. It is easy to check that it suffices to make the prerequisite constraints defined in the proof of
Theorem 11 bi-directional and the rest of the arguments remain valid. □
By contrast, finding a POM with maximum cardinality is hard even for uniform corequisites. Let us
mention here that the intractability of this problem is also implied by Theorem 7 of [15], using the connection
between cacr and the price-budget case of the many-to-many matchings, but the following theorem is
stronger as it provides tighter bounds on the sizes of supercourses and the capacities of applicants.
Theorem 19. max caucr-d and max pom caucr-d are NP-complete even if each applicant has capacity
at most 2, each course has capacity 1 and each equivalence class has cardinality at most 2.
Proof. Now it suffices to replace the prerequisite y1i → y2i by y1i ↔ y2i in the proof of Theorem 14. The
argument in the penultimate paragraph of the proof of that theorem needed Pareto optimality of the given
matching M to ensure that each applicant is either assigned both courses y1i and y2i or none, but this is now
ensured by corequisites. □
We now strengthen this result by showing that max pom cacr is very difficult to approximate.
Theorem 20. max pom cacr is NP-hard and not approximable in polynomial time within a factor of
N1−ε, for any ε > 0, unless P=NP, where N is the total capacity of the applicants, even in the case of
uniform corequisites and if each course has capacity 1.
Proof. Let ε > 0 be given. Let B be an instance of (2,2) -e3 -sat, where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} is the set of
variables and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} is the set of clauses. Let β =
⌈ 2
ε
⌉
and let α = nβ .
We form an instance I of cacr as follows. Let X∪Y ∪Z be the set of courses, where X = {x1i , x2i , x¯1i , x¯2i :
1 ≤ i ≤ n}, Y = {y1i , y2i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zD}, where D = 6n(α− 1) + 1. The courses in X
correspond to the first and second occurrences of vi and v¯i in B for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let A∪G∪{b, h} be
the set of applicants, where A = {aj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} and G = {g1i , g2i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Each course has capacity
1. Each applicant in A has capacity 1, each applicant in G has capacity 2, h has capacity 2n−m and b has
capacity D.
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For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), courses y1i and y2i are corequisites. Also all the courses in Z are corequisites. For
each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and for each s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3), x(csj) is as defined in the proof of Theorem 14. The preference
lists of the applicants are as follows:
P (aj) : x(c1j ), x(c2j ), x(c3j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
P (g1i ) : y1i , y2i , x1i , x2i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
P (g2i ) : y1i , y2i , x¯1i , x¯2i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
P (h) : [X]
P (b) : [X], [Z]
In the preference lists of h and b, the symbols [X] and [Z] denote all members of X and Z listed in arbitrary
strict order, respectively. In I the total capacity of the applicants, denoted by N , satisfies N = D+ 6n. We
claim that if B has a satisfying truth assignment then I has a POM of size D + 6n, whilst if B does not
have a satisfying truth assignment then any POM in I has size at most 6n.
For, suppose that f is a satisfying truth assignment for B. We form a matching M in I as follows. For
each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if f(vi)=true then add the pairs (g1i , y1i ), (g1i , y2i ), (g2i , x¯1i ), (g2i , x¯2i ) to M . On the other
hand if f(vi)=false then add the pairs (g1i , x1i ), (g1i , x2i ), (g2i , y1i ), (g2i , y2i ) to M . For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), at
least one literal in cj is true under f . Let s be the minimum integer such that the literal at position s of cj
is true under f . Course x(csj) is still unmatched by construction; add (aj , x(csj)) to M . There remain 2n−m
courses in X that are as yet unmatched in M ; assign all these courses to h. Finally assign all courses in Z
to b in M . It may be verified that M is a POM of size D + 6n in I.
Now suppose that f admits no satisfying truth assignment. Let M be any POM in I. We will show that
|M | ≤ 6n. Suppose not. Then |M | > 6n and the only way this is possible is if at least one course in Z
is matched in M . But only b can be assigned members of Z in M , and since all pairs of courses in Z are
corequisites, it follows that M(b) = Z.
We next show that, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), either {(g1i , y1i ), (g1i , y2i )} ⊆ M or {(g2i , y1i ), (g2i , y2i )} ⊆ M .
Suppose this is not the case for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). As a consequence of the corequisite restrictions on
courses in Y , y1i and y2i are unmatched in M . Let M ′ be the matching obtained from M by deleting any
assignee of g1i worse than y2i (if such an assignee exists) and by adding (g1i , y1i ) and (g1i , y2i ) to M . Then M ′
dominates M , a contradiction.
We claim that each course in X is matched in M . For, suppose that some course x ∈ X is unmatched.
Then let M ′ be the matching obtained from M by unassigning b from all courses in Z, and by assigning b
to x. Then M ′ dominates M , a contradiction.
It follows that every course in X∪Y is matched inM . Since |X∪Y | = 6n and the applicants in A∪G∪{h}
have total capacity 6n, every applicant in A ∪G ∪ {h} is full.
Create a truth assignment f in B as follows. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if (g1i , y1i ) ∈ M , set f(vi)=true,
otherwise set f(vi)=false. We claim that f is a satisfying truth assignment for B. For, let j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) be
given. Then (aj , x(csj)) ∈ M for some s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3). If x(csj) = xri for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r (r ∈ {1, 2})
then f(vi)=true by construction. Similarly if x(csj) = x¯ri for some (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r (r ∈ {1, 2}) then
f(vi)=false by construction. Hence f satisfies B, a contradiction.
Thus if B is satisfiable then I admits a POM of size D + 6n = 6n(α − 1) + 1 + 6n > 6nα. If B is not
satisfiable then any POM in I has size at most 6n. Hence an α-approximation algorithm for max pom
cacr implies a polynomial-time algorithm to determine whether B is satisfiable, a contradiction to the
NP-completeness of (2,2) -e3 -sat.
It remains to show that N1−ε ≤ α. On the one hand, N = 6n + D = 6nα + 1 ≤ 7nα = 7nβ+1. Hence
nβ ≥ N
β
β+1 7−
β
β+1 . On the other hand, N = 6nα + 1 ≥ α = nβ ≥ 7β as we may assume, without loss of
generality, that n ≥ 7. It follows that 7−
β
β+1 ≥ N− 1β+1 . Thus
α = nβ ≥ N
β
β+1 7−
β
β+1 ≥ N
β
β+1N
− 1
β+1 = N
β−1
β+1 = N1−
2
β+1 ≥ N1−ε. □
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7. Alternative prerequisites
In this section we turn our attention to caapr, the analogue of capr in which prerequisites need not
be compulsory but may be presented as alternatives. We will show that, in contrast to the case for capr,
finding a POM is NP-hard, under either additive or lexicographic preferences.
Recall that as capr is a special case of caapr, Lemma 2 implies that finding a most-preferred bundle of
courses under additive preferences is NP-hard. Now we prove a similar result for lexicographic preferences.
Notice that it might be tempting to extend SM-CAPR to the case with alternative prerequisites: one might
think that when applicant ai is considering course cj it suffices to choose the most-preferred course from the
set of its alternative prerequisites. However, this might lead to the necessity to add too many courses to the
assignment of ai, thereby exceeding her capacity. By closely following the construction in the proof of the
following lemma one can deduce where the difficulties may arise.
Lemma 21. The problem of finding the most-preferred feasible bundle of courses of a given applicant with
lexicographic preferences in caapr is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce from vc-d, the decision version of vc, which is the problem of finding a vertex cover
of minimum size in a given graph. vc-d is NP-complete [30]. Let ⟨G,K⟩ be an instance of vc-d, where
G = (V,E) is a graph andK is a positive integer. Assume that V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and E = {e1, e2, . . . , em}.
We construct an instance I of caapr as follows. Let the set of courses be V ∪ E ∪ {b} (again, we use the
same notation for vertices and edges in G as we do for courses in I, but no ambiguity should arise.) There
is a single applicant a1 with capacity m+K + 1 whose preference list is as follows:
P (a1) : b, e1, e2, . . . , em, v1, v2, . . . , vn.
Course b has a single compulsory prerequisite course e1, and each course ej (2 ≤ j ≤ m − 1) has a single
compulsory prerequisite course ej+1. Moreover, all the E-courses have (alternative) prerequisites; namely,
for any j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), if course ej corresponds to the edge ej = {vi, vk} then ej ↦→a1{vi, vk}. We claim
that G admits a vertex cover of size at most K if and only if I admits a matching in which a1 is assigned
course b.
For, suppose that G admits a vertex cover S where |S| ≤ K. Form a matching M by assigning a1 to the
bundle B = {b} ∪ E ∪ S. Then B is a feasible bundle of courses for a1, and b ∈ B.
Conversely, suppose I admits a matching M in which a1 is assigned a bundle B containing course b.
Then, due to the prerequisites, B must contain all E-courses and for each course in ej ∈ E, B must contain
some course in vi ∈ V that corresponds to a vertex incident to ej . Let S = B ∩ V . Clearly S is a vertex
cover in G, and as q(a1) = m+K + 1, it follows that |S| ≤ K.
A polynomial-time algorithm for finding the most-preferred bundle of courses for a1 can then be used to
decide whether I admits a matching in which a1 is assigned b, hence the result. □
As noted in Section 3, in the case of just one applicant a1, a matching M is a POM if and only if a1 is
assigned inM her most-preferred feasible bundle of courses. Hence Lemma 21 implies the following assertion.
Theorem 22. Given an instance of caapr the problem of finding a POM is NP-hard even if there is only
a single applicant. The result holds under either additive or lexicographic preferences.
We finally remark that, since capr is a special case of caapr, Theorem 11 implies that the problem
of determining whether a given matching M in an instance of caapr is a POM is co-NP-complete for
lexicographic preferences (and also for additive preferences by the remark following Theorem 11).
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8. Open problems and directions for future research
We would like to conclude with several open problems and directions for future research.
1. Refining the boundary between efficiently solvable and hard problems. In the proofs of the
NP-hardness and inapproximability results in this paper we had some applicants whose preference
lists were not complete, whose capacity was not bounded by a constant, and/or whose prerequisite
structure was of unbounded depth. Will the hardness results still be valid if there are no unacceptable
courses, all capacities are bounded, and prerequisites are more structured (e.g., by an upper bound
on the number of prerequisites per course or in total)? These problems also call for a more detailed
multivariate complexity analysis. It might be interesting to determine whether restricting some other
parameters, e.g., the lengths of preference lists, may make the problems tractable. Another interesting
question to investigate is the approximability of the problem of finding the maximum size of a POM
in the case of acyclic prerequisites.
2. Indifferences in the preference lists. In this paper, we assumed that all the preferences are strict.
If preference lists contain ties, sequential mechanisms have to be carefully modified to ensure Pareto
optimality. Polynomial-time algorithms for finding a Pareto optimal matching in the presence of ties
have been given in the context of hat (the extension of ha where preference lists may include ties) by
Krysta et al. [31] and in its many-to-many generalisation cat (the extension of ca where preference
lists may include ties) by Cechla´rova´ et al. [32]. However as far as we are aware, it remains open to
extend these algorithms to the cases of capr and cacr where preference lists may include ties.
3. Strategic issues. By a standard argument, one can ensure that the sequential mechanism that
lets each applicant on her turn choose her entire most-preferred bundle of courses (i.e., the serial
dictatorship mechanism) is strategy-proof even in the case of prerequisites. However, serial dictatorship
may be very unfair, as the first dictator may grab all the courses and leave nothing for the rest of the
applicants. Let us draw the reader’s attention to several economic papers that highlight the special
position of serial dictatorship among the mechanisms for allocation of multiple indivisible goods:
serial dictatorship is the only allocation rule that is Pareto efficient, strategy-proof and fulfils some
additional properties, namely non-bossiness and citizen sovereignty [33], and population monotonicity
or consistency [34]. We were not able to obtain a similar characterisation of serial dictatorship for
capr.
As far as the general sequential mechanism is concerned, a recent result by Hosseini and Larson [35]
shows that no sequential mechanism that allows interleaving policies (i.e., in which an ai is allowed
to pick courses more than once, and between two turns of ai another applicant has the right to pick
a course) is strategy-proof, even in the simpler case without any prerequisites. It immediately follows
that SM-CAPR is not strategy-proof. However, it is not known whether a successful manipulation can
be computed efficiently. Further, we have shown that in capr, not all POMs can be obtained by a
sequential mechanism. We leave it as an open question whether a strategy-proof and Pareto optimal
mechanism other than serial dictatorship exists in capr.
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